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IN THE SUPREMET COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COLONIAL LEASING COMPANY OF NEW 
ENGLANC, INC,, a Massachusetts 
corporation, d/b/a COLONIAL-
PACIFIC LEASING CO,, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MICH~EL RAY LARSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
LI 
No, 1938Z 
On a motion for summary judgment the trial court and 
appellate court must construe all facts and inferences most 
favorably toward the party opposing the motion, even as to those 
issues upon which the opposing party would have the trial burden, 
Wilkins v, Lane County, 671 P 2d 1178 (OrApp,1983), 
So construed, the facts are that in 1977 defendant needed 
to finance the acquisition of a crawler-loader, The financing 
was eventually arranged by United Leasing (Chuck Brazier) of Salt 
Lake City with plaintiff, Following the negotiations, plaintiff 
paid Mountain West Machinery of Salt Lake City the total price of 
the e~uipment amounting to approximately $33,000,00, The equip-
rn~nt was delivered directly by Mountain West Machinery to defendant, 
(R 53-57), To co~plete t~e transaction ~he defendant then entered 
ir.to t'v:e "lease" arra~·~ee'.".ecr.t with plaintiff (R 5-8), The written 
instrument called for 60 monthly payments of $8S8. 71 for a total 
of .$51,522 .. 60. It further provided for annual extensions there-
after for no rental. 
Plaintiff claims the written instrument is a true lease where-
as defendant's claim is that it is a security agreement. 
At the time of the lease it was the trade custom and usage 
to accord the lessees an option to purchase the equipment at the 
end of the lease for its residual value (R 53-57). 
At the time of the lease defendant \Cas granted an oral opt. ior: 
to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease for its residual 
value (R 53-57). 
In granting summary judgment, the trial court assumed that 
the only factor was the option and because it was not contained 
in tne written agreement evidence to establish it would be inad-
missible at trial because of the statute of frauds and parol 
evidence rule. There was thus left remaining the question of 
true lease versus security agreement determined upon an analysis 
of the appropriate criteria for such d_stinction. 
By the terms of Sec70A-l-201(37), U.C.A., 1953, whether a lease 
creates a security interest is to be determined by the facts of 
each case. The key factor is the intention of the parties. Sectic:· 
70A-9-102,U.C.A., 1953. The terms of the agreement itself are 
obvio~sly relevant in deter~ining the intent of the parties. 
Just as the inclusion in the lease of a purchase cpt1on do.os :iut -
itself imply a secured installment sale,-the excl~s1cn of ~n~ j:,s 
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not automatically imply a true lease. FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-
Printers, 590 P 2d 803 (Utah, 1979); Matter of Fashion Optical, 
Ltd., 653 F 2d 1385 (lOCCA, 1981); 76 ALR 3rd, Sec. 2l[a]. 
Oral or extrinsic evidence is admissible and not subJect 
to the prohibition of the parol evidence rule as proof of the 
true nature of the purported lease agreement. McKeeman v. 
Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 320 F.Supp. 938 (DC Neb., 
1970); Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P 2d 1276 (Utah, 
1980); Pendleton Grain Growers v. Pedro, 530 P 2d 85, 271 Or. 24 
(1975); Story v. Hamaker, 423 P 2d 185, 248 Or. 584 (1967). 
Evidence as to usage and custom in the trade is also 
admissible to establish the option. Section 70A-2-202, U.C.A., 
1953 (a written contract may be explained or supplemented·"(a) by 
course of dealing or usage of trade * * * or by course of perform-
mance * * *"); State ex rel. Nichols v. Safeco Ins. Co., 671 P 2d 
1151 (New Mex App, 1983); 17 ALR 3rd 1010 Sec. 11 [bl. 
The evidence as to the option renders the integration clause 
of the lease in question ineffective. FMA, supra. 
~here a lease does not contain a specific option to purchase 
but permits renewal of the lease for rentals considerably less 
than the rentals contained in the original lease ter~s. the lease 
is intended for security. 
seci..:rity interest]. 
76 ALR 3rd 11 [UCC-Equipment lease as 
Other factors indicated in the case of Bur!Dughs Corporation 
v. C•<tury Steel, :nc., 664 P 2d 354 ('.:::_ev., 1983) are present in 
this case and are reaso~able and imperative for consideration in 
,':~".c.ect1cc. with the factual deteccminatior.s as to whether a 
particular transaction between parties is a true lease or one 
intended as security. In the instant case a factual issue cema1ns 
which can only be resolved by a determination of factors w1th1n 
the analytical framework dictated by and within the pervue ot, 
Sections 70A-l-201(37) and 70A-9-102, U.C.A., 1953. 
The ultimate inferences to be drawn from the facts contained 
in the present record are in favor of defendant's claim of security 
interest or agreement; or such inferences are not clear and there-
fore summary judgment is not appropriate. Bigger v. Freemont 
Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 340 NW 2d 142 (Neb., 1983). 
The authorities cited by plaintiff pertain to issues not 
present here with the exception of In re Atlantic Times, Inc., 
295 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Georgia, 1966) iM which the holding of 
the court is that where the option is not contained in the written 
instrument, the transaction is one of lease, and In re Fina~cial 
Computer Systems, Inc., 474 F 2d 1258 (9th Cir., 1973) where the 
court held evidence of an oral option to be inadmissible as in 
violation of the statute of frauds. 
cases is otherwise in Utah. 
The rule as stated in those 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROYAL i. HUNT 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct cc~1~s 
of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to L. Ed~ard Robbins 
attorney for plaintiff-respcndent, at his last kno~n ajJr~ss as 
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follows. 1657 East 9400 South, Sandy, Utah 84092, by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, in a sealed envelope, on February 1, 1984. 
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